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Abstract
This paper presents an experimentally grounded model on the relevance of partner
selection for the emergence of trust and cooperation among individuals. By combining
experimental evidence and network simulation, our model investigates the link of inter-
action outcome and social structure formation and shows that dynamic networks lead to
positive outcomes when cooperators have the capability of creating more links and iso-
lating free-riders. By emphasizing the self-reinforcing dynamics of interaction outcome
and structure formation, our results cast the argument about the relevance of interaction
continuity for cooperation in new light and provide insights to guide the design of new
lab experiments.
Keywords: trust; investment game; cooperation; laboratory experiment; agent-based
model; network structure; partner selection.
1 Introduction
Recent experimental studies have explicitly acknowledged the relevance of trust for coopera-
tion in human societies (e.g. Barrera & Buskens 2009; Berg et al. 1995; Boero et al. 2009a,b;
Camerer 2003; Keser 2003). From a sociological perspective, the problem with these stud-
ies is that they took into account stylized and highly unrealistic interaction structures, e.g.,
random coupled subjects, so that the structure of the game was nothing but a sequence of
one-shot interactions. This was due to the standard laboratory approach of economic studies
that is aimed to purse the potential effect of the embeddedness of agents in complex social
structures. On the contrary, many formal models with a more concrete sociological content
investigated exactly how structural embeddedness affected trust and cooperation, but without
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referring to empirically verified assumptions on agents’ behavior (e.g. Cohen et al. 2001;
Pujol et al. 2005).
This paper aims to study the link between interaction outcomes and social structure for-
mation by combining experimental evidence and social network simulation through an agent-
based model (from now ABM). Unlike influential studies that emphasized the relevance of
interaction continuity for the emergence of cooperation (e.g. Axelrod et al. 2002; Cohen
et al. 2001), we investigate whether the robustness of cooperation depends on the capability
of agents to select their partners and whether this might be influenced by the particular net-
work structure where they are embedded in. For this purpose, the advantage of combining
laboratory experiments and simulation models is twofold. On one hand, experiments provide
sound and clean data on agents’ behavior on which to build informative micro-macro models.
Unfortunately, this is a not so common practice, since most cooperation models have been
based on stylized theoretical assumptions rather than on specific empirical evidence so far.
On the other hand, ABM can extend experimental evidence by providing for the impossibility
of exploring complex interaction structures and long-term macro dynamics and evolution in
the laboratory. In this mutual benefit, there is a cross-fertilization that could be largely benefi-
cial for sociological research (e.g. Boero & Squazzoni 2005; Chmura & Pitz 2007; Dal Forno
& Merlone 2004; Ebenhöh & Pahl-Wostl 2008; Janssen & Ostrom 2006; Rauhut & Junker
2009; Rouchier 2003).
In light of this inspiration, we have extended the scope of a standard experimental eco-
nomics game, the repeated investment game, to situations that were impossible to explore in
the laboratory by introducing the effects of complex network structures. Our main substantial
result is that different static network structures do not lead to outcomes substantially differ-
ent from random networks. A substantial increase in cooperation occurs only when partner
selection and dynamic structure formation are introduced, which allow cooperators to break
their links with free-riders and let them to benefit from an higher number of interactions.
Our results show that the robustness of cooperation among agents, rather than being fa-
vored by the stability of the interaction structure, as suggested by previous studies (e.g. Ax-
elrod et al. 2002), have more to do with the selective intelligence of agents when they give
rise to networks based on people who like each other that isolate bad apples. Moreover,
our experimentally-grounded results confirm the findings of Eguíluz et al. (2005) model,
where the cooperative equilibrium in a Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a dynamic network
was guaranteed by “leaders” (agents in central position) that played a crucial role in sustain-
ing cooperation in the system. In fact, also in our case, the presence of a cooperative agent in
a central position in dynamic networks had a crucial influence in shaping a structure favorable
to cooperation composed of trustful and trustworthy agents.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the research
background. Section 3 describes the experiment used to gather the data. Section 4 presents
the estimation of agents’ parameters. Section 5 introduces the models and presents the results.
Finally, Section 6 discusses our findings.
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2 Research background
Most studies on cooperation assumed that individuals have no choice over which opponents
they play (e.g. Axelrod 1984, 1997). This implied that, especially in large populations,
cheaters may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, thereby exploiting co-
operators. The simulation literature has suggested that the stability and continuity of the
interaction structure might provide a solution to combat exploitation by cheaters in social
interaction. Simulating an iterative prisoner’s dilemma, Cohen et al. (2001) have suggested
that even just the continuity of the interaction patterns can make cooperative regimes come
true in hostile environments, since the “shadow of the future” established through it preserved
the contexts in which cooperation strategies worked, allowing later variants and emulations to
find a supportive environment. In light of this, Axelrod et al. (2002) have emphasized that the
persistence of interaction patterns was enough to guarantee cooperation, thereby dispensing
from more complex linkage pattern mechanisms.
Although important, these findings did not capture the full picture of cooperation in hu-
man societies and underestimated more powerful social mechanisms that can sustain it. A
prominent social mechanism that permits cooperators to decrease the risk of being cheated
in many real social interactions, by isolating cheaters, is partner selection. It is likely that
in concrete social situations individuals have preferential choice and can opt out from given
interactions (e.g. Slonim & Garbarino 2008). Partner selection is not just a mean for indi-
viduals to do good preferential choices, but it also provides an incentive to the counterparts
to be reliable and committed to others so as to avoid social isolation (e.g. Ashlock et al.
1996). For example, Joyce et al. (2006) have built a simulation model largely inspired by
Axelrod’s tournament that demonstrated that a conditional association strategy, i.e., assuming
that agents left partners who defected against them and stayed with cooperative partners, was
better performing than the conditional altruism postulated by Axelrod with the Tit-for-Tat
strategy. A similar finding on the relevance of contingent strategies capable of discriminating
good and bad partners was also found in a simulation by Aktipis (2004).
These interactional aspects have been explained by the strategic uncertainty reduction
and the “commitment bias” arguments, with the former emphasizing rational strategic as-
pects and the latter intrinsic other-regarding or emotional motivations. The first position has
been stressed by Kollock (1994) in an experimental study on market transactions, where the
challenge to deal with information asymmetries and uncertainty about the others’ trustwor-
thiness made long-term interaction partners look more attractive than others. Podolny (2001)
suggested that investment bankers that operated in markets characterized by a higher degree
of uncertainty were likely to interact with colleagues they have interacted with in the past.
Gulati (1995) found the same evidence in an empirical study on firm alliances. More recently,
Beckman et al. (2004) have confirmed this in an empirical study on interlock and alliance
networks for the 300 largest US firms during the 1988-1993 period, where they found that
there was a strong correlation between the type of market uncertainty and the stable/unstable
nature of partner selection networks: firms facing firm-specific uncertainty were less selec-
tive and more open to new ties than firms facing collective market uncertainty. Hauk (2001)
developed a simulation model of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma where partner selection was a
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learning strategy for agents in uncertain situations, with agents that learn how to discriminate
between trustworthy and untrustworthy partners and to reward/punish others as well. By re-
vising strategies according to selected partners, cooperators learn how to avoid that cheaters’
exploitative strategies throve in the population. In two experiments conducted in the US and
Japan, Yagamashi et al. (1998) have found that uncertainty promoted commitment forma-
tion between partners but, in particular, that individuals trusting more others tended to form
committed relations less frequently than skeptics, since they relied more on generalized trust.
The second position argued that the risk and uncertainty of exchange provided the oppor-
tunity for partners to demonstrate their trustworthiness so that behavioral commitments and
trust signals can sustain cooperation in an informal and spontaneous way, without negotia-
tions, bargaining and binding agreements as in most social exchange literature (e.g. Molm
et al. 2000). Recent simulation studies have suggested that partner selection can generate
a “commitment bias”, so that people’ commitment to existing partners can increase beyond
instrumental reasons, thanks to the strengths of intrinsic other-regarding motivations (Back &
Flache 2006, 2008). Back (2010) has confirmed this hypothesis creating a lab commitment-
dilemma game based on a market exchange between subjects who played in artists selling
paintings’roles and computer-simulated collectors buying them, in six locations of three
countries, i.e., the Netherlands, China and the US. The findings have showed that the ini-
tial commitment of buyers had a positive effect on partner selection, even when controlling
for uncertainty reduction and material benefits.
Although full of insights of great importance for sociological analyses of social interac-
tion, these studies did not take into the due account the relevance of complex social structures,
and in particular the consequences of partner selection within certain social structure config-
urations. Most of the experimental literature on partner selection have typically investigated
the internal aspects of the selection decision, rather than the consequences of it over time
for the emergence of trust and cooperation (e.g. Haruvy et al. 2006; Kagel & Roth 2000).
Recently, Slonim & Garbarino (2008) have investigated the relevance of partner selection
for trust and altruism in the lab, by playing an investment game and a variant of the dictator
game, where subjects’partners were exogenously imposed or endogenously chosen. Never-
theless, they underestimated the relevance of studying partner selection sociologically within
network formation processes, that is by investigating how network structure and partner se-
lection can influence each other. In fact, partner selection is to be viewed as a driving force
for network formation, stability and change (Beckman et al. 2004).
At the same time, the abundant literature on network formation that explained important
aspects of cooperation in social and economic situations was more analytically oriented than
explicitly based on experimental evidence, did not take into account large social systems (e.g.
Calvó-Armengol 2001; Dutta et al. 2005; Jackson & Watts 2002; Jackson & Wolinksy 1996)
and did not investigate the crucial role of partner selection as a driving force for the network
dynamics (e.g. De Vos et al. 2001). An interesting exception was Eguíluz et al. (2005), who
elaborated a social network simulation based on a spatial prisoner’s dilemma to investigate
the co-determination of individual strategies and network, but without partner selection at the
agent level and lab data for the modeling of agent decisions.
Our paper aims to fill this gap by combining experimental evidence and network sim-
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Player A
1. Invests I∈{0,1,...,e}
((
Player B
2. Returns R∈{0,1,...,e+3I}
hh
Figure 1: The investment game: player A profit = e− I+R; player B profit = e+3I−R.
ulation to study partner selection, trust and network configurations. This is to understand
relevant interaction aspects that is impossible to look at in the laboratory and to provide new
insights to improve the sociological content of current economic laboratory experiments.
3 The experiment
Our goal was to observe individuals’ behavior in asymmetric trust situations, i.e., where a
trustor has to choose whether placing trust or not in another individual (the trustee) who has a
rational incentive to cheat (Coleman 1990, 177–180). The experimental economics standard
for studying these situations was the investment game, a protocol based on Berg et al. (1995).
The game has been repeated many times using different samples and under a vast range of
different conditions (e.g Cronk 2007; Keser 2003; King-Casas et al. 2005; Knoch et al.
2009; Ortmann et al. 2000) and, recently, it has gained interest also among sociologists (e.g.
Barrera & Buskens 2009; Boero et al. 2009b; Buskens & Raub 2008; Molm et al. 2000).
Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of a typical investment game. Participants were
coupled and randomly assigned to different roles, called player A (the trustor) and player B
(the trustee). Both players received an endowment of e ECU. First, player A had to decide the
amount I between 0 and e to send to B, keeping for him/herself the part (e− I). The amount
sent by A was tripled by the experimenter and sent to the trustee, in addition to his/her own
endowment, who decided how much to return to A. As before, the amount returned by B could
be any integer between 0 and (d+3I). The amount (d+3I−R) not returned represented B’s
profit, while R was summed to the part kept by A to form the final profit of the latter, which
was hence calculated as (e− I +R). All profits earned during the game were counted in
experimental currency units (ECU), translated in real money using a fixed exchange rate and
payed immediately after the end of the experiment. The game is called “investment game”
since the rule of tripling the amount sent by the trustor implies that (a) the trustor deals with
the uncertainty of paying a cost at the beginning of the interaction to gain possibly higher
revenues at the end, and (b) the trustee has a return from the trustor’s decision.
Since B had no rational incentive to return anything to A, the dominant strategy for A
players was to invest zero. This led to a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, where both
players kept their entire endowments. However, this was inefficient since any sum grater
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than zero invested by A was tripled by the experimenters and could lead to a Pareto superior
outcome, with the optimum represented by A investing the whole endowment. Despite these
equilibrium predictions, a quite robust result of investment games played both in the labo-
ratory and in the field was that A players invested a substantial amount of their endowments
(usually around 40%) and that B players returned slightly less than the amount invested by
A, although much less than a fair share of the overall amount (d+3I) that they received (e.g
Berg et al. 1995; Boero et al. 2009b; Cronk 2007; Keser 2003; Ortmann et al. 2000).
Our experiment was based on a repeated version of the investment game as described
above. One hundred and eight subjects were recruited through public announcements and
played the game in six groups of 18 individuals. Half of the subjects were students of the
University of Brescia, half of the University of Torino (Cuneo campus). The experiment took
place in Spring 2009 in the computer laboratories of the Faculties of Economics of the two
universities, which were both equipped with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). All groups received exactly the same instructions and played a repeated investment
game using an identical computer interface. The endowment was 10 ECU with an exchange
rate of 1 ECU = 2.5 Euro. Participants earned, on average, approximatively 15 Euros, in-
cluding a show up fee of 5 Euros, that were paid immediately after the experiment. The
experiment, including instruction reading, took approximatively one hour.
All interactions took place through the computer network and the subjects were unable
to identifying their counterparts. Participants played a repeated investment game for a total
of 10 periods and were informed in advance of the number of periods to play. The experi-
ment used a “stranger” matching protocol, i.e., randomly re-coupling of subjects after each
period. This protocol permitted to control for the use of direct reciprocity strategies among
participants. The players’ roles were randomly assigned at the beginning of the first period
and subsequently changed on a regular basis, so that each subject played the same number of
period in both roles.
The results show that subjects invested, on average, 3.48 ECU and returned 2.79 ECU,
slightly less than what is usual in similar games.1 This can be explained if subject pool used,
which was composed of undergraduate students in business and economics, is taken into
account. This population is well known for under-average cooperation in experiments and
this is even more true when subjects played investment and trust games (see Camerer 2003,
65).
4 Parameter estimation
We used these experimental data to calibrate an ABM that reproduced the behavior of the
subjects. With regards to A players, we estimated a coefficient βi that indicated how much
the player modified his/her investment each round in function of the difference between the
amount invested and the amount received by B players in the previous round. For any player
i and round t, we computed the difference Xit = Ri− Ii, where Ii and Ri were the amounts that
i invested and received as return from his/her investment in the previous round respectively.
1All statistical analysis were conducted using the R 2.10.1 platform (R Development Core Team 2009).
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Figure 2: Distribution of the estimated coefficients
We subsequently fitted the model
Yit = αi+βiXit + ε (1)
where Yit was the amount invested by player i in round t, in order to obtain two parameters αi
and βi for each subject that defined his/her behavior as A player. The equation (1) took into
account that A players could have had an individual constant propensity to trust represented
by the individual intercept αi, but also the capability of reacting upon past experiences, which
was captured in the βi coefficient.
On the other hand, B players were supposed to react mainly against what they received
from A players. In order to capture their behavior, we estimated a third coefficient γi defined
as the average amount returned by each subject as proportion of the amount received in each
round plus the fixed endowment. Therefore, the parameter γi represented an estimate of the
player’s trustworthiness.
We were able to successful estimate the parameter for 105 out of the 108 subject that
participated in the experiment. Figure 2 presents the distribution of the estimated coefficients.
It is worth noting that, while βi did not significantly correlated with the other parameters,
the correlation between αi and γi was significant and positive (r = 0.44, p < 0.001). In
other terms, trustful subjects tended to be trustworthy as well: a result consistent with the
hypothesis that agents who have a general propension toward cooperation behave similarly
in different situations..
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5 The models
5.1 Experiment replication
We first built an experimentLike model that replicated the original experiment.2 In each pe-
riod agents were coupled and played an investment game either as A or as B player. At the
end of the periods they were randomly re-coupled while their roles alternated on a regular ba-
sis. The behavior of each agent depended on the coefficient estimated from the experimental
data. More specifically, each agent i playing in the role of A in period t invested an amount
I(i, t) = αi+βi [R(i, t−1)− I(i, t−1)] (2)
where αi and βi were the coefficients of the corresponding participant while I(i, t− 1) and
R(i, t−1) were the amounts invested and received in the previous round. In the first round of
the game, we set I(i,0) = R(i,0) = 0 that made agents choosing their first move on the basis
of αi alone. This was justified since αi reflected the intrinsic propensity of the participants
(and, henceforth, of our agents) to trust others players, while βi represented the effect of past
experience. On the other hand, when playing on the B positions agents returned
R(i, t) = γi[3I(i, t)+10] (3)
which was simply their endowment multiplied by the individual parameter γi estimated on
the experimental data.
Based on this setting, we built an experimentLike model, which succeeded in reproducing
the experimental data.3 The average investment over 100 run of the experimentLike model
was 3.57 ECU and the average return 2.76 ECU (see Tab. 2). A t test over individual invest-
ments/returns, averaged over the 10 periods of the game, confirmed that these figures did not
significantly differ from the experiment (respectively, t = 0.288, p = 0.774 two sided, and
t =−0.085, p = 0.933 two sided).
5.2 The simulation scenarios
Once checked the model capability of reproducing the experimental data, we designed new
scenarios to test the plausible effects when important variables in the experimental design
were modified. All scenarios used the experimental data as input and, more generally, were
identical to experimentLike model except for the specific characteristic(s) under examination.
Table 1 provides an overview of all simulation scenarios.
A first simple variation of the game design was to increase the number of periods played
by agents. This has been done for all scenarios, including the experimentLike model, that
2Note that we drawn from the data 105 valid estimations out of 108 subjects. Being the game played in
dyads, we decided to remove randomly one of the experiment participants at the beginning of each run of the
model, which, as a result, included only 104 agents.
3All models were programmed in Java using the JAS Library (http://jaslibrary.sourceforge.net/). Interested
readers can obtain the source code upon request by the authors.
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Model name Main characteristics
experimentLike • random coupling in each period
• one way interaction
twoWays • random coupling in each period
• two way interaction
fixedCouples • fixed couples
• two way interaction
denseNetwork • fixed fully connected network
• two way interaction
smallWorld • fixed small-world network
• two way interaction
scaleFree • fixed scale-free network
• two way interaction
dynamic1Couples • dynamic network
• broken links are replaced only for isolated agents
• two way interaction
• start from random coupling
dynamic1Dense • dynamic network
• broken links are replaced only for isolated agents
• two way interaction
• start from dense network
dynamic2Couples • dynamic network
• broken links are replaced only by one of the two formerly linked
agents
• two way interaction
• start from random coupling
dynamic2k10 • dynamic network
• broken links are replaced only by one of the two formerly linked
agents
• two way interaction
• start from from a regular network of degree 10
Table 1: The simulation scenarios
were tested both using a 10 and a 30 period game. Then we explored the introduction of
two way interaction among agents, i.e. in each period agents played both as A and B with
their opponent (twoWays model). Note that, while this extension of the model could be of
no particular interest in itself, it provided a baseline for subsequent scenarios which extended
the interaction to a number of agents greater than two.
Since we knew that differences in the network structure can have crucial consequences
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for the cooperation at a macro level, we built four models that explored the effect of different
network structures. The fixedCouples model simply maintained the initial couples throughout
the whole run. The denseNetwork model introduced a fully connected network where, in each
period, every agent interacted with all other agents. In the smallWorld model, we introduced
a fixed “small-world” network structure (Watts & Strogatz 1998; Watts 1999) with initial
degree 4 and re-wiring probability 0.01. The scaleFree model was based on a “scale-free”
network that conformed to Barabási & Albert (1999) algorithm with a degree equal to 3. In
all these models, the network structure remained fixed throughout the whole game. Note
that agents may have more than one interaction per period. More specifically, they played an
investment game both as A and as B with all other agents with whom they were linked in the
current period.
Finally, two models were introduced to investigate the effects of the introduction of a
dynamic network in the game. Basically, these scenarios added a criterion of partner selection
to the formation of couples, so that interaction structure was dynamically shaped by the
outcome of the interaction (e.g. Corten & Buskens 2009; Eguíluz et al. 2005; Flache 2001).
Since there was no way to derive from the experiment the algorithm that agents used to
break their links and create new ones, we identified certain plausible algorithms using as few
assumptions as possible. We built two different models, both based on simple mechanisms
but with a slightly different focus. The first one (named dynamic1) was designed to avoid that
any agent became isolated — i.e. no longer linked to any other agent — while the second
(dynamic2) was aimed at maintaining constant the total number of links in the network.
Both models were based on the idea that “unsatisfied” agents could break their links. In
other words, we assumed that agents had a threshold happiness function so that they changed
partners when they were unhappy. The threshold function was very simple: A agents were
happy when B returns were higher or equal to the ones in the previous time step. This makes
sense on the light of some fundamental attitudes of human beings as highlighted by economic
psychology (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 2000). Note also that a similar strategy for determin-
ing agents’ satisfaction has been assumed, for instance, in Bravo (2010) work that modeled
the emergence of institutions in common-pool-resource situations. We assumed that a couple
could be broken when at least one agent of the couple was unhappy. When there was no past
information to evaluate the happiness — i.e. in the first two periods — the couple remained
fixed.
The only difference between the two dynamic models regarded the algorithm for the
definition of the new links. In the dynamic1 model, broken links were replaced only when an
agent became isolated. In this case a new link was formed between the isolated agent and a
new agent different from the one with whom it was linked before. In the dynamic2 model,
after each link break, one of the two formerly connected agents was chosen at random to
initiate a new link. In this case, no check was made and agents may become isolated. This
second algorithm maintained constant the number of links in the network, while changing its
structure at the same time.
Both the dynamic1 and the dynamic2 model were tested starting from different initial net-
work structures. More specifically, we used random coupling and a fully connected network
as starting point for the former and random coupling and a random network of average de-
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10 period game 30 period game
Model name A investments B returns A investments B returns
experimentLike 3.57 (2.50) 2.76 (2.62) 3.56 (2.53) 2.76 (2.63)
twoWays 3.57 (2.52) 2.76 (2.61) 3.57 (2.54) 2.76 (2.61)
fixedCouples 3.65 (2.53) 2.91 (3.13) 3.67 (2.56) 2.92 (3.17)
denseNetwork 3.57 (2.54) 2.76 (2.61) 3.57 (2.54) 2.76 (2.61)
smallWorld 3.58 (2.54) 2.76 (2.62) 3.57 (2.54) 2.76 (2.62)
scaleFree 3.61 (2.54) 2.80 (2.68) 3.61 (2.54) 2.80 (2.69)
Experiment 3.48 (2.69) 2.79 (3.58) – –
Table 2: Average investments and returns in the original experiment and in the simulation scenarios.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Simulation results significantly different from the experimental
ones are highlighted using a bold font.
gree 10 for the latter. The difference was due to the fact that the second re-coupling algorithm
determined a situation where each agent was connected to every other and there was no other
possibility of re-linking than re-building the broken connection. Having two link replacement
algorithms and two initial network structure, we tested four dynamic models named, respec-
tively, dynamic1Couples, dynamic1Dense, dynamic2Couples and dynamic2k10. All dynamic
models were run for 30 periods in order to see the evolution of the network in a time longer
than the original experiment.
5.3 Static network model results
In order to take into account the stochastic elements of the models, we ran 100 replications for
each scenario. Table 2 presents the average investments and returns in all models, comparing
them with the experiment.
The first important point is that neither the modification of the network structure nor
the increase of the number of periods changed significantly the outcome of the game. In
most of the runs, models reached their equilibrium before the 10th period, maintaining it
subsequently with no major change. Even the introduction of two-way interactions, which
increased the number of investment games played by agents in every run, simply accelerated
the approaching to the equilibrium without altering the results. Similarly, letting agents play
over a fully connected network, where each agent interacted with all other agents in every
single period (resulting in a total of 214,240 interactions per run in the 10 period game and in
642,720 interactions in the 30 period one) did not change the overall results. In all these cases,
according to a t test, the average investments and returns of the models did not significantly
differ from the experiment.
The introduction of networks where not all the agents had an equal number of interactions
posed a challenge for our analysis. Up to now, to check the statistical significance of the
difference between the simulation results and the experiment, we used a t test over individual
averages. This worked fine as long as all the agents interact an equal number of times, while
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Model name αi βi γi
experimentLike –0.75∗∗∗ 0.08 –0.91∗∗∗
twoWays –0.74∗∗∗ 0.10 –0.92∗∗∗
fixedCouples –0.71∗∗∗ 0.22∗ –0.85∗∗∗
denseNetwork –0.73∗∗∗ 0.12 –0.92∗∗∗
smallWorld –0.72∗∗∗ 0.11 –0.91∗∗∗
scaleFree –0.46∗∗∗ 0.14 –0.69∗∗∗
Table 3: Correlation between average payoffs per run and agents’ parameters. Significance codes:
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
it lead to an overestimation of the weight of agents with a lower number of interactions in
case of networks where the number of links for each agent were different. For instance,
the average investment in the 10 period scaleFree model was 3.61 when considering each
single interaction. However, taking in consideration the average contribution for each agent,
the resulting average was 3.57. Although small, this difference could affect the significance
of our results. Moreover, it was likely that the difference increased moving from static to
dynamic networks. In order to take into account this issue, we performed our t tests on
the weighted means, where the weights were obviously given by the number of interactions
performed by each agent.
The smallWorld and scaleFree model results were very similar to the previous ones: the
average amount invested were slightly higher than the experiment, but a t test showed that
this difference was not significant. Also the average returns were almost identical to the
experiment.
An interesting question was whether the change in the network structure would have
changed the relative advantage of cooperators (i.e. trustful and trustworthy individuals) over
free-riders. We estimated the relation between the value of the three parameter defining each
agent and the payoff earned in the different scenarios. Since average investments and returns
did not change moving from a 10 to a 30 period game, we took into account only the 10
period game. Table 3 reports the correlation coefficient between the agent parameters and its
earnings.
In most models, earnings significantly and negatively correlated with both αi and γi, while
the correlation with βi was not significant. In other words, both trustful and trustworthy in-
dividuals earned lower payoffs in all games, while the agent ability to react to others’ action
did little difference. There was one noticeable exception to this rule, namely the fixedCouples
model where the correlation coefficient relative to βi, although small, was positive and sig-
nificant at the 5% level. This means that reactive agents, by increasing their investments after
a high return and decreasing them following a low return, were somewhat advantaged in this
setting. This was probably due to the fact that the fixed couple structure of the game tended to
favor reciprocity based strategies. Another partial departing from the rule mentioned above
was the scaleFree model. In this case the relation between the agents’ trust (measured by αi)
and their earnings was much weaker than in any other situation. To some extent, the same
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Period 1–10 Period 11–20 Period 21–30
Model name A invest. B returns A invest. B returns A invest. B returns
dynamic1Couples 3.65 (2.58) 2.92 (2.96) 3.67 (2.60) 2.95 (2.90) 3.68 (2.62) 2.96 (2.93)
dynamic1Dense 3.79 (2.67) 3.32 (3.20) 3.66 (2.60) 2.96 (2.96) 3.68 (2.62) 2.97 (2.94)
dynamic2Couples 3.82 (2.68) 3.37 (3.42) 4.48 (3.01) 5.02 (4.50) 4.63 (3.11) 5.58 (5.12)
dynamic2k10 4.11 (2.82) 4.00 (3.59) 4.43 (3.01) 4.85 (4.30) 4.49 (3.04) 5.02 (4.50)
Experiment 3.48 (2.69) 2.79 (3.58) – – – –
Table 4: Average investments and returns in the original experiment and in the dynamic network
models. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Averages significantly different (at the 10% level)
from the experimental ones are marked in bold.
was true for their trustworthiness (γi).
5.4 Dynamic network model results
Moving from a static to a dynamic network led to noticeable results (see Tab. 4). Note
that, being the network no longer static, the amount sent and returned in the different parts
of the game varied. Therefore, we separately analyzed the results of periods 1–10, 11–20
and 21–30 of the game. The average cooperation in the dynamic1 models slightly increased,
even if a t test (performed on the weighted means for the reasons given above) showed that
the difference was significant only for returns in the first ten rounds of the dynamic1Dense
model ( t = 1.446, p = 0.075, one sided). The dynamic1Dense model resulted in higher
cooperation levels than the dynamic1Couples one because cooperative agents, starting from
103 links each, were initially able to sever most of them, thereby avoiding be exploited by
free-riders. However, this strategy became no longer possible once the situation settled down
to an average of 1–2 links per agent, with the consequence that trustful agents’ earnings
decreased below those of the less trustful agents.
Especially interesting was the network dynamic. Apparently the system had a single
equilibrium, which was reached independently from the starting point. From period 9 on-
wards, the average degree of the networks resulting from the dynamic1Couples and the dy-
namic1Dense models converged to the value of 1.67±0.02 (Fig. 3, left panel). This was true
although the initial degrees of the two networks were, respectively, 1 and 103. The final net-
work structure of the two models was also very similar with, in both cases, all agents linked
in small groups of 2-8 individuals (Fig. 3, center and right panels).
Most of the times, the center of the group was represented by an especially cooperative
agent, a fact consistent with the findings of Eguíluz et al. (2005) model, where agents played
a Prisoner’s Dilemma on a dynamic network and the equilibrium was guaranteed by “leaders”
(agents in central positions) that played an essential role in sustaining cooperation in the
system. In the network plotted in the middle of Figure 3, agents with more than two links
had an average αi of 4.02, while the one for agents with two links or less was 3.75. Similarly,
agents with more than two links had an average βi of – 0.21 (vs. 0.22) and an average
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Figure 3: The system resulting from the dynamic1 models converged to a fixed equilibrium indepen-
dently from the starting point. The left panel shows the average degree of the networks resulting from
the two models. The center and the right panel report the networks resulting after 30 periods of a
typical run of the dynamic1Couples and the dynamic1Dense model respectively.
γi of 0.21 (vs. 0.13). More generally, both αi and γi of agents were positively correlated
with the number of interactions in the last 10 periods of the game. In the dynamic1couples
the correlation coefficients were, respectively, 0.42 and 0.86, while in the dynamic1dense
they were 0.40 and 0.78.4 In other words, agents with more links (thereby performing more
interactions) were both more trustful and more trustworthy.
As for the static models, we studied the relation between the agents’ parameters and their
earnings. Table 5 report our estimations. The results of the dynamic1 models did not depart
much from the static network ones. Again trustful and trustworthy agents were disadvan-
taged, while the capacity to react made little difference. One noticeable exception appeared
in the final periods of the dynamic1Couples model, where the coefficient related to the βi
parameter became significant. This was rather surprising, because the small stable emerging
groups (Fig. 3, center panel) were not very different from the dyads that characterized the
fixedCouples model, which also produced a significant correlation between βi and agents’
earnings.
Another exception was found in the initial periods of the dynamic1Dense model, where
the correlation coefficient for αi was almost zero and the one for γi was positive and highly
significant. However, this situation did not persist and in the period 11–20 the coefficient be-
came already positive and highly significant. The initial advantage for trustworthy agents was
due to their capacity of maintaining their links longer, while untrustworthy lost theirs because
of the unsatisfaction of their opponents. Similarly, trustful agents were not worse off than the
others because they quickly broke their unsatisfying links. However, once the network settled
up, the situation changed and the coefficients became similar to the dynamic1Couples model.
The dynamic2Couples model led instead to a strong increase in cooperation (Tab. 4).
Returns were already significantly higher than in the experiment in the first 10 periods of the
game and further increased subsequently. Investments were significantly higher than in the
4All estimates were significant at the 1% level.
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Model name Period αi βi γi
dynamic1Couples 1–10 –0.78∗∗∗ 0.11 –080∗∗∗
11–20 –0.78∗∗∗ 0.16 –0.67∗∗∗
21–30 –0.68∗∗∗ 0.21∗ –0.66∗∗∗
dynamic1Dense 1–10 0.02 –0.18 0.64∗∗∗
11–20 –0.72∗∗∗ 0.17 –0.66∗∗∗
21–30 –0.66∗∗∗ 0.15 –0.61∗∗∗
dynamic2Couples 1–10 –0.13 –0.05 0.53∗∗∗
11–20 0.37∗∗∗ –0.14 0.96∗∗∗
21–30 0.37∗∗∗ –0.14 0.95∗∗∗
dynamic2k10 1–10 0.32∗∗∗ –0.19 0.87∗∗∗
11–20 0.36∗∗∗ –0.18 0.96∗∗∗
21–30 0.35∗∗∗ –0.19 0.97∗∗∗
Table 5: Correlation between average payoffs per run and agents’ parameters. Significance codes:
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
experiment from the 10th period onwards. Starting from the same period, returns were higher
than investments as well. In other words, investments became profitable for A players. This
was also clear when looking at the correlations presented in Table 5. The correlation between
the agents’ payoffs and both their αi and γi became positive and significant, i.e., trustful and
trustworthy agents earned, on average, higher payoffs. The explanation is that more trustful
and trustworthy agents had more links, so enjoying a higher number of exchanges than less
trustful/trustworthy ones. More precisely, the correlations between αi and γi of each agent and
the number of interactions that the same agent performed during the whole 30 period game
were both positive and significant (r = 0.38, p < 0.001 and r = 0.92, p < 0.001 respectively).
Vice versa, less cooperative agents became easily isolated and earned, on average, lower
payoffs.
The resulting network was also remarkably different from the dynamic1 model. Many
agents were now isolated, while a large cluster emerged around the most cooperative agents
(Fig. 4). Therefore, the most trustful/trustworthy agents were the most connected. For
instance, the average αi of agents with zero or one link in Fig. 4 was 3.41, while the average
αi of agents with two or more links was 4.57. Similarly, the average γi of agents with zero or
one link was 0.10, while the average γi of agents with two of more links was 0.22.
The dynamic2k10 model presented a strong increase of cooperation (Tab. 4). Unlike be-
fore, both the average investments and returns were higher than in the experiment already
in the first ten periods. Investments and returns further increased in the subsequent periods,
even if they finally settled down at a slightly lower value than in the dynamic2Couples model.
As before, investments became profitable for A player from period 10 onwards. The correla-
tions between agents’ parameters and payoffs followed a path similar to the dynamic2Couples
model, with the exception that the correlation between the agents’ αi and their payoffs was
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Figure 4: Networks resulting after 30 periods of a typical run of the dynamic2Couples model (left)
and of the dynamic2k10 model (right).
positive and significant from the beginning of the game (Tab. 5). Overall, trustful and trust-
worthy agents enjoyed a larger number of interactions. The correlation between agents’ pa-
rameter and number of interactions was significant at the 0.1% level for both αi and γi (while
it was negative and significant only at the 10% level for βi).
The network resulting from a typical run of the dynamic2k10 model was presented in
Figure 4 (right). Unlike the previous case, no agent was now isolated. However, cooperative
agents maintained a larger number of links. For instance, the average αi of agents with five
or less links was 2.73, while for agents with more than five links this figure is 4.17. Similarly
the average γi of the former group was 0.07, while the one for the latter group is 0.17.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have presented an experimentally grounded ABM that extended the results
of lab experiments on trust to study the impact of the interaction structure on the cooperative
outcomes. The first important lesson that we can draw from our results is that it is not the
stable or unstable nature of the interaction structure per se which has a relevant impact on
trust diffusion and cooperation. Our result supported the hypothesis that what really matters
is the link of interaction outcome and structure formation. While a simple change of the
network structure did not alter significantly the outcome of our game, the introduction of a
dynamic network led to higher cooperation when cooperative agents had the capability to
create more links and, possibly, to isolate free-riders.
This first result stands in stark contrast with the popular literature emphasizing the effects
of network structure on interaction outcomes (e.g. Barabási 2009; Buchanan 2002; Watts
1999). The “shadow of the future” postulated by Axelrod (1984) and Cohen et al. (2001)
certainly represents an important factor in explaining cooperative outcomes. However, once
trust has been eroded in static networks by untrustworthy actions, the stability of links be-
tween agents using conditional strategies can only produce a never ending run of mutual
defection. On the contrary, by permitting agents to leave their partners cooperation increases
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since the exploitation opportunities of free-riders are reduced. This is exactly what happened
in our simulations under the dynamic2 conditions. Trustful and trustworthy agents were no
longer bound to reciprocate defection, but were in position to find new partners with whom
they started cooperative relations. As a consequence, overall cooperation increased, bringing
higher fairness and efficiency in the system.
This has implications for sociological and experimental analyses on cooperation and so-
cial norms. Previous simulation models highlighted the relevance of tags for cooperation
(e.g. Axelrod et al. 2004; Hales 2000). In sociological terms, tags can be viewed as commu-
nication signals that circulate among people and connotate certain attributes of individuals or
groups. For instance, they include speaking dialects or particular accents, dressing elegant
formal get-ups, or driving garish customized sport-cars. Although largely unintentional and
often inaccurate or even false, these attributes or actions might be socially used as predic-
tors of the others’ behavior, in particular when interacting with unknown partners, although
they can be unintentional, inaccurate or false. As suggested by the simulation model pre-
sented in Riolo et al. (2001), the presence of tags in a social system can help cooperation
to emerge even without past experience, memory, reciprocity motives or reputational signals.
This makes partner selection different than in our case, where it was based on past experi-
ence of each agent individually. The point is that, if individuals can detect tags or exchange
some communication signals before interacting, it is likely that the intelligibility of partner
selection and the consequent structure formation can be strongly influenced. This is where
the dark side of partner selection is likely to enter the picture, i.e., when tag-based selection
is biased by discriminative social beliefs and gives rise to inefficient network formation by
preventing unknown partners from potential interaction benefits. If this is reasonable, future
laboratory experiments that compare the impact of social tags and past experience on partner
selection and structure formation should be particularly welcomed.
Another point is that, if it is reasonable to expect that interaction outcomes matter to
give rise to social structures, as we have stressed, it should be essential to investigate em-
pirically and experimentally how social expectations about the trustworthiness of potential
partners and the trusting-other attitudes of individuals are influenced by cultural aspects, in-
stitutions and normative values at a social level. This is of particular interest in the study on
the nature and evolution of markets, as suggested by North (2005). Firstly, particular market
institutional scaffolds might be more efficient that others because they have institutionalized
partner selection as a relatively low-cost sanctioning for cheaters. Secondly, particular market
structure configurations might have historically evolved out of partner selection mechanisms,
as suggested also by White (2004), so that complex market structures could be nothing but a
magnification of relatively simple social mechanisms..
A second lesson concerns precisely the relevance of partner selection. The increase of
cooperation via partner selection has implication both for the efficiency of the system and
for its fairness. In the dynamic2 conditions the average investment increased by one third
and the average return almost doubled in comparison with both the experiment and the static
networks. While the standard in the experimental literature on trust and cooperation often
assumed randomly re-matching couples, as though the game were a sum of one-shot periods,
with no chance for partner selection, our results suggested that cooperation can crystallize
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in stable interaction structures that were likely to depend on the positive outcomes generated
by agent interaction. This means that it is reasonable to suppose that individual action and
interaction structure tend to co-evolve in the social life (e.g. Buskens & Weesie 2000; Buskens
et al. 2008; Mark 1998). Our experimentally grounded model allows us to emphasize that
one of these self-reinforcing co-evolutionary links could be driven by partner selection (e.g.
Corten & Buskens 2009; Flache 2001; Eguíluz et al. 2005). If this is reasonable, by excluding
from the radar screen of the experimental analysis these aspects, it is likely that something
crucial for explaining social mechanisms of cooperation gets lost.
The third lesson concerns the research methods. By combining laboratory experiments
and simulation models, we were able to exploit some of the advantages of both. This is not
a common practice, even if earlier works that followed our same inspiration have already
suggested some of its potentialities (e.g. Boero et al. 2010; Dal Forno & Merlone 2004;
Deadman et al. 2000; Jager & Janssen 2003; Rouchier 2003). Being empirically defined, the
distribution of strategies used by our agents was more plausible than what was commonplace
in research based on formal models. At the same time, thanks to simulation, we were able to
extend the experimental results beyond the limits of the laboratory (e.g., a larger number of
interactions, more complex network structures, etc.).
The link between experiments and simulation is not limited to the creation of empirically-
grounded models. Verifying in the lab hypotheses deriving from simulation research is be-
coming relatively common. A recent example of experimentally tested ABM is Centola et al.
(2005) “Emperor’s Dilemma”, whose conclusions have been tested by Willer et al. (2009).
Our simulation evidence can therefore guide the design of a new set of both field studies
and laboratory experiments explicitly targeted to study partner selection behavior or, more
generally, to gain a better understanding of the relation between individual preferences and
the dynamics of social networks. For instance, our model supports the hypothesis that allow-
ing individuals to select their interaction partners increases per se the amount of both trust
and trustworthiness in a given system. This could be checked in field studies by comparing
contexts of social interaction that vary in their degree of individual freedom in choosing their
partners (e.g., firm and consumer behavior in monopolistic vs. competitive markets). It is
also reasonable to suppose that partner selection can cover relevant functions of informal so-
cial control and sanctioning in many social and economic situations when the partner choice
and the break of existing links becomes a socially shared information. This opens the door to
interesting investigations on the relations between partner selection and reputation both for
social order, as a means for norm abiders to isolate and punish cheaters (e.g. Pinyol et al.
2008), and for environmental exploration, as a means to know what is the best partner choice
in uncertain situations (e.g. Boero et al. 2010). The same hypothesis could be checked with
more accuracy in the lab by designing a trust-game experiment where individuals can decide
whether maintaining or not their current relations, even if this comes at the cost of reducing
the number of interactions and the range of potential partners.
To sum up, by linking trust and partner selection our results emphasize new research
directions. What is especially important is that the level of analysis moves from static to dy-
namic networks. Real world networks are rarely fixed and independent of individual actions.
They evolve over time as the result of a myriad of independent choices done by agents em-
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bedded therein. Taking into account the aggregate level effects of these choices is complex
and will plausibly involve a great deal of both empirical and computational new research.
However, this will nicely improve our knowledge of fundamental social mechanisms and, a
fortiori, of important social situations.
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